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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY: STATE REGULATION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF THE DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC
TESTING INDUSTRY
I. INTRODUCTION
Does your DNA hold evidence of Native American ancestry? Are you
likely to experience muscle pain while taking cholesterol-lowering drugs?
Are you at an increased risk for developing Parkinson’s disease? Do you
produce wet or dry earwax? Advances in genetic and medical science have
led to the rise of the direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing industry,
allowing people to discover answers to hundreds of such questions from the
comfort of their homes. At a federal level, this industry remains largely
unregulated, although there have been recent movements toward the
imposition of new standards. In the meantime, states have been left to
decide how to individually manage these new companies. Some states have
no laws on this subject, permitting all kinds of DTC genetic testing, while
others have effectively banned the DTC testing industry by imposing
physician prescription requirements, laboratory licensing, informed consent
requirements, and strict interpretations of the definition of “the practice of
medicine.” DTC genetic test companies have taken varying approaches to
this tangle of regulations, some changing their business models and others
trying to find ways to circumvent these standards.
Through enforcement actions consisting of cease and desist letters,
grants of state licenses, threats of civil fines, and public awareness
campaigns, states such as New York, Maryland, and California have been
able to bring most DTC genetic testing companies into compliance with
state laws and regulations. However, it appears some DTC testing
companies are still not complying with laws in states that prohibit DTC
testing “on the books” but have yet to undertake enforcement actions. Due
to the lack of scientific understanding in the general public and the risks
involved with sensitive medical information, some form of consumer
protection is needed. In order to effectively regulate this industry, active
enforcement mechanisms are necessary to help companies understand
regulations and promote compliance.
Part II of this paper describes the history and the present state of the
DTC genetic testing industry, and lays out the advantages and
disadvantages of this new technology. This section will also give a brief
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overview of the current state of federal regulation.1 Part III will examine the
various approaches states have taken in regard to this regulation problem. It
will consider states that allow the DTC genetic testing industry to operate
unregulated, as well as those states that impose restrictions such as
physician prescribing, laboratory licensing, informed consent, and strict
interpretations of the practice of medicine.2 Part IV will investigate those
actions taken by states when DTC genetic test companies fail to comply with
their laws.3 Part V will explore industry reaction to these enforcement
actions.4 Finally, the analysis in Part VI will address what lessons can be
learned from state attempts at regulation and what concepts should be
included in the forthcoming implementation of federal regulations.5
II. BACKGROUND
In the nearly 60 years since Watson and Crick discovered the structure
of DNA, the science of genetics has advanced rapidly.6 However, it is only
within the past decade that it has become practical to apply this newfound
knowledge towards improvements in human health.7 With the completion of
the Human Genome Project’s mapping of the genome in 2003,8 scientists
have begun to unlock the relationships between the deviations in genetic
sequences and disease.9 Variations in single base pairs, known as single
nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs or snips), can be correlated with risks of
certain diseases.10 While the conventional medical community has been
slow to incorporate these discoveries into ordinary primary care, some
entrepreneurs have decided to take advantage of this technology.11 They
have bypassed physicians and marketed genetic tests to consumers over the
1. See infra Part II.
2. See infra Part III.
3. See infra Part IV.
4. See infra Part V.
5. See infra Part VI.
6. Genetics and Genomics Timeline, GENOME NEWS NETWORK (2004), http://www.ge
nomenewsnetwork.org/resources/timeline/1953_Crick_Watson.php.
7. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing and the Consequences to the Public: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
111th Cong. 2 (2010) [hereinafter Shuren Statement] (statement of Jeffrey Shuren, Director,
Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Food and Drug Administration).
8. Human Genome Project Information, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF SCI. (July 31,
2012), http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/home.shtml.
9. See Shuren Statement, supra note 7, at 2.
10. SNP Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF SCI. (Sept. 19, 2008),
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/faq/snps.shtml.
11. See Pascal Borry et al., Where Are You Going, Where Have You Been: A Recent
History of the Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Market, 1 J. COMMUNITY GENETICS 101,
102 (2010).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2012]

RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY

169

internet.12 These DTC genetic tests have taken a number of forms, including
tests that evaluate monogenic diseases, complex disease susceptibility,
reactions to pharmaceuticals, nutrition, and ancestry.13 This market
expanded rapidly, and by 2009 over 30 different DTC genetic test
companies were in operation.14 Initially, it appeared the public was
infatuated with the idea of taking control of its own health and unlocking the
information contained within each genetic code.15 For example, the DTC
genetic test company 23andMe was named the 2008 Time Invention of the
Year.16
However, scientists and regulators have begun to voice some concerns
about the accuracy, public perception, and value of these tests.17 Most
diseases are multifactorial, resulting from a combination of multiple genes
and environmental factors rather than from a single mutation in a single
gene.18 DTC genetic tests often report back with a category of risk of
contracting a disease.19 However, risk is often defined in different ways, and
such genetic tests are rarely conclusive.20 In 2006, the Federal Trade
Commission noted that “having a particular gene doesn’t necessarily mean
that a disease will develop; not having a particular gene doesn’t necessarily
mean that the disease will not,”21 and warned consumers to interpret these
tests with “a healthy dose of skepticism.”22 As Jessica Stransky of the genetic
counseling program at the University of Maryland said, “‘That kind of
information is pretty hard for the average person to interpret. . . . It gets
more complicated with genetic traits that aren’t highly linked to certain
conditions.’”23 Additionally, these tests estimate risk based on genetic factors

12. See id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Timothy Caulfield & Amy L. McGuire, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing:
Perceptions, Problems and Policy Responses, 63 ANN. REV. MED. 23, 26 (2012).
16. Anita Hamilton, Best Inventions of 2008, The Retail DNA Test, TIME (Oct. 29, 2008),
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1852747_1854493_185411
3,00.html.
17. Caulfield & McGuire, supra note 15.
18. Jeanne Erdmann, Home Genetics Tests Are Called Unreliable, STL TODAY, March 23,
2011, http://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/medical/home-genetics-tests-are-call
ed-unreliable/article_cee6a092-0dc7-565e-b159-b53215f42ba1.html.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Jane E. Brody, Buyer Beware of at-Home Genetic Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at
D6.
22. Caulfield & McGuire, supra note 15, at 27.
23. Lisa Cleary, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Debate, NBC WASH., Aug. 14,
2011, http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/health/Direct-to-Consumer-Genetic-TestingDebate-112986579.html.
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alone, ignoring the impact of environment, lifestyle, and family history.24 The
American Medical Association (AMA) has warned that without the guidance
of a physician or genetic counselor, test results could lead to
misinterpretation, miscalculation of risks, and unwarranted lifestyle changes,
or at the very least, money could be needlessly wasted on tests with little
scientific value.25
A 2010 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) studied
four major DTC genetic test companies and came to the conclusion that the
tests are “misleading and of little or no practical use.”26 After submitting
samples from the same donors to different companies, the investigators
found a single person could be told he was at below average, average, and
above average risk for a single disease, depending on which company was
used.27 Another blow to the industry’s credibility occurred in June 2010,
when a sample swap at 23andMe resulted in 96 customers receiving data
that did not belong to them, leading to confusion, distress, and privacy
concerns.28 In May 2010, Walgreens dropped its plan to sell Pathway
Genomics over-the-counter kits in its stores upon investigative action by the
FDA.29 These incidents have led to questions about the adequacy of the
regulation of this industry.30
Most of the calls for increased regulations come from those concerned
about protecting consumers.31 Many commentators have been concerned
that the results of DTC genetic tests can cause anxiety or lead to harmful
behavior changes.32 Commentators are concerned consumers will either
24. Felix W. Frueh et al., The Future of Direct-to-Consumer Clinical Genetic Tests, 12
NATURE REVS. GENETICS 511, 511 (2011).
25. Letter from Michael D. Maves, Exec. Vice President, Chief Exec. Officer, Am. Med.
Ass’n to U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Feb. 23, 2011) (on file with Am. Med. Ass’n), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/399/consumer-genetic-testing-letter.pdf.
26. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-847T, DIRECT TO CONSUMER GENETIC
TESTS: MISLEADING TEST RESULTS ARE FURTHER COMPLICATED BY DECEPTIVE MARKETING AND OTHER
QUESTIONABLE PRACTICES 1 (2010).
27. Id. at i.
28. Daniel MacArthur, Sample Swaps at 23andMe: A Cautionary Tale, WIRED SCIENCE
(June 7, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2010/06/Sample-swaps-at23andMe:-a-cautionary-tale.
29. Sherry Jacobson, Walgreens’ Dropping of Genetic Test Kits’ Relieves Experts, STL
TODAY (May 17, 2010), http://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/medical/walgreensdropping-of-genetic-test-kits-relievesexperts/article_d75a363a-6aa5-59ab-815b-a24a12b
a6002.html.
30. Caulfield & McGuire, supra note 15, at 27.
31. Id.; Maves, supra note 25.
32. Caulfield & McGuire, supra note 15, at 27. However, recent studies have suggested
these concerns about stress and psychological harm from DTC genetic test results may have
been over-stated. See Cinnamon Bloss et al., Effect of Direct-to-Consumer Genomewide
Profiling to Assess Disease Risk, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 524, 529 (2011).
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overreact to an increased risk of disease or gain a false sense of security
from a report of a lowered risk.33 There is the potential danger of creating a
population of the “worried well” who spend time and resources to deal with
the results of their tests, which may only be grounded in weak science.34
Adding to this confusion is the marketing strategies of many of these
companies, which suggest that customers will be empowered to make
informed and personalized healthcare and lifestyle decisions, implying more
control over many of these diseases than science currently holds.35 There
are also concerns that the results of these tests will spur people to make
unnecessary appointments with physicians, increasing the burden of an
already overworked healthcare system and exposing patients to the risk of
iatrogenic harm.36 Finally, observers are also concerned about privacy risks
and the uncontrolled disclosure of genetic information, given that neither
traditional physician-patient confidentiality nor HIPAA standards necessarily
apply.37
The tort system seems incapable of effectively regulating this industry.
This incapability is evidenced by only one major attempt at bringing a classaction lawsuit against a DTC genetic test company. In Blumer v. Acu-Gen
Biolabs, the plaintiffs brought a products liability action against the
manufacturer of the Baby Gender Mentor Kit, which was advertised to
determine the gender of a fetus through genetic analysis of maternal blood
samples with a 99% degree of accuracy.38 The plaintiffs brought claims
under false advertising, consequential damages, failure to provide the
guaranteed refund, and infliction of emotional distress.39 However, when
Acu-Gen was dissolved in 2010, the case was no longer financially viable
and the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice.40 This has left
the legal community with doubts as to the viability of using lawsuits to keep
the DTC genetic test industry in check. The ability to bring lawsuits in the first
place can be dubious, due to the cost, time, and effort needed. Additionally,
any lawsuit in this highly technical area is likely to come down to a “battle of
the experts” and potentially result in a Daubert hearing over the validity of

33. Caulfield & McGuire, supra note 15, at 27.
34. Frueh et al., supra note 24, at 511.
35. See Caulfield & McGuire, supra note 15, at 24.
36. Id. at 29. Iatrogenic harm is defined as “injury caused by doctors and health care
institutions.” BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 41 (6th ed.
2008).
37. Caulfield & McGuire, supra note 15, at 29.
38. Blumer v. Acu-Gen Biolabs, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 81, 83, 84 (D. Mass. 2009).
39. Id. at 83.
40. Annmarie Giblin, Direct to Consumer Genetic Testing: A Pandora’s Box of Potential
Litigation, DRI TODAY, Sept. 5, 2011, http://dritoday.org/feature.aspx?id=67.
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the mostly unsettled science behind the genetic tests.41 Finally, in cases such
as Blumer where no final resolution is reached, no rule of law emerges by
which others in the industry can be regulated.
Some may argue that if these tests are truly without credibility, they will
go the way of “snake oil” treatments of the past, and disappear due to
market forces.42 While this may be the eventual outcome for the more shady
and unreliable members of this industry, they should not be permitted to
mislead and harm uninformed consumers in the meantime. Others may
claim that the responsibility should fall to consumers to be adequately
informed before ordering a test kit, and that the customers should shoulder
the risk of being misled. However, this industry is vastly different from
traditional consumer purchasing agreements of the past, presenting new
challenges.43 This is a highly technical field relying almost entirely on
cutting-edge science.44 As a result of the young age of this science, many of
those who are purchasing DTC genetic tests likely received very little
education in genetics. There is a gross imbalance between the level of
understanding of the general public and those who are marketing genetic
tests with all kinds of hopeful promises.45 As a result, consumers are placing
a large amount of trust in the results they receive from their genetic tests.
Some form of government regulation is needed to help stabilize this
imbalance in knowledge and understanding.
It has been difficult to “determine the most appropriate way to regulate
a product that has multiple purposes, that is sold to consumers
internationally and over the internet, and that has been found by federal
investigation to have questionable validity and unproven utility.”46 Currently,
DTC genetic tests fall within a grey area of federal regulation.47 Both the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Federal Food
41. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). A Daubert
challenge is a hearing held before the beginning of trial at which the admissibility of expert
testimony is decided. Id. at 582. Courts look to a number of factors, including whether the
scientific theory has been tested, if it has been subjected to peer review and publication, its
error rate, standards controlling its application, and its general acceptance in the scientific
community. Id. at 593-94. Since the algorithms used to test SNPs are rapidly evolving, it is
unlikely there would be a consensus in the scientific community, leading to protracted battles
at trial between experts with opposing opinions. See Shuren Statement, supra note 7, at 7-8.
42. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 47, 98-112
(1982).
43. See Caulfield & McGuire, supra note 15, at 30.
44. See id. at 27.
45. See Kishore, Test at Your Own Risk: Your Genetic Report Card and the Direct-toConsumer Duty to Secure Informed Consent, 59 EMORY L.J. 1553, 1588 (2010).
46. Caulfield & McGuire, supra note 15, at 24.
47. Meredith Wadman, Gene-Testing Firms Face Legal Battle, 453 NATURE 1148, 1148
(2008).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2012]

RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY

173

and Drug Administration (FDA) share in responsibility for regulating this
industry.48 CMS is responsible for overseeing all tests developed and
performed in-house, known as laboratory developed tests (LDTs).49 The FDA
regulates tests that are marketed as medical devices.50 Under § 201(h) of
the Federal Food and Drug Cosmetic Act, a device is defined as any
instrument that is “intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other
conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease.”51
Typically, a test kit that bundles components and is labeled for a particular
use is referred to as an in vitro diagnostic test (IVD), which is a medical
device that cannot be marketed without FDA approval.52 However, most
genetic tests are not sold as kits, but rather the tests are performed in-house
on samples sent in by mail.53 As a result, they are classified as LDTs that are
not subject to FDA oversight or even strict scrutiny by CMS.54 As long as a
laboratory meets minimum quality controls under Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Amendments (CLIA), there are no accuracy reviews and no
mandatory proficiency testing.55
However, there has been a lot of movement towards increasing federal
oversight of this industry. In 2008, the FDA published guidelines on
regulating medical devices known as In Vitro Diagnostic Multivariate Assays
(IVDMIAs), a particular class of LDTs, which encompasses some genetic
tests.56 The FDA intends to begin regulating this particular class of tests
because they are more intricate and carry greater risks than other more
traditional LDTs.57 On July 22, 2010, the House of Representatives’
Subcommittee on the Oversight and Investigations on Energy and
Commerce held a public hearing entitled “Direct-to-Consumer Genetic
Testing and the Consequences to the Public Health.”58 In March 2011, the
FDA’s molecular and genetics group held a meeting to discuss DTC genetic

48. Dianne Bourque et al., Issues and Trends in the Regulation of Genetic Testing,
LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, Apr. 2009, at 3, available at 2009 Emerging Issues
3537.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(2) (2006).
52. Bourque et al., supra note 48, at 6.
53. Id. at 4.
54. Id. at 4, 8.
55. Id. at 4.
56. Id. at 8.
57. Bourque et al., supra note 48, at 8.
58. Giblin, supra note 40. The hearing examined the sale of DTC personal genetic tests
and included testimony from the GAO, FDA, academia, and industry. Direct-to-Consumer
Genetic Testing and the Consequences to the Public: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. (2010).
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testing.59 Between May 10, 2010 and May 11, 2011, the FDA sent letters to
manufacturers of DTC genetic tests, advising them they appeared to be
selling medical devices and therefore needed FDA clearance.60 As a result,
many testing companies are left confused by this tangle of federal
regulations, unsure of whether their test requires CLIA certification under
CMS, FDA approval, or both, and are left trying to anticipate what future
federal regulations may require of them.61
In the meantime, the responsibility of regulation has fallen to the states.
They have been left to their own devices in deciding how to manage this
new industry. The director of the Genetics and Public Policy Center stated,
“‘In the absence of federal leadership on genetic testing oversight, it is not
surprising that the states are stepping in.’”62 The result is a complex and
diverse set of regulations that vary widely between states.63 While trying to
serve their national customer base, DTC genetic test companies are faced
with the task of complying with unique regulations and requirements in each
state in order to avoid penalties.
III. STATE LAWS
Through CLIA, all states have the authority to regulate genetic testing
laboratories.64 CLIA designates that patient tests must be requested by an
authorized person, and an “[a]uthorized person means an individual
authorized under State law to order tests or receive test results, or both.”65
Therefore, the definition of an authorized person varies between states. As a
result, the law “‘is very inconsistent from state to state at a time when the
risks to consumers do not vary state to state — and when we have
businesses that are certainly operating state to state.’“66 Twenty-three states
do not have any statutes addressing DTC testing, meaning there is no

59. Giblin, supra note 40. This was a non-voting panel meeting held to discuss and make
recommendations on scientific issues concerning DTC genetic tests that make medical claims.
Summary from the Molecular & Clinical Genetics Panel Meeting – March 8 & 9, 2011, DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.genomicslawreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/
03/FDA-DTC-Advisory-Panel-Meeting-Summary.pdf.
60. Giblin, supra note 40.
61. See id.
62. Turna Ray, Will Other States Follow NY, Calif., in Taking on DTC Genetic-Testing
Firms?, GENOMEWEB, PHARMACOGENOMICS REPORTER (June 25, 2008), http://www.ge
nomeweb.com/dxpgx/will-other-states-follow-ny-calif-taking-dtc-genetic-testing-firms-0.
63. See generally GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., SURVEY OF DIRECTTO-CONSUMER TESTING STATUTES AND REGULATIONS, BERMAN INSTITUTE OF BIOETHICS (2007)
(demonstrating the variety of direct to consumer regulations among the states).
64. Borque et al., supra note 48, at 9-10.
65. 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (2011).
66. Wadman, supra note 47, at 1149.
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regulation or limitations on the industry’s ability to market their product to
consumers.67 Fifteen states have statutes that effectively ban the DTC genetic
test industry, through the use of a variety of physician ordering requirements,
laboratory licensing, informed consent, and scope of the definition of “the
practice of medicine.”68 Other states are situated between these extremes,
limiting the types of DTC tests available or specifying certifications that must
be obtained before tests can be marketed to consumers.69 This results in a
highly fragmented and complex regulatory picture for any DTC genetic test
company hoping to market its services nationwide.
A.

States Actively Permitting DTC Genetic Tests

A small number of states have statutes or regulations permitting DTC
genetic testing, meaning they are direct-access states.70 For example,
Virginia state law not only allows patients to order tests and receive results, it
also provides some protection for physicians who fail to act on the results of
a test that they themselves did not order, or results of a test that were not
brought to them for consultation.71 Virginia law also provides that when a
test is requested without the authorization of a physician, the results shall be
reported to the person who was the subject of the test.72 The results need to
include a statement in bold type that it is the responsibility of the test subject
to “arrange with his physician for consultation and interpretation of the
results.”73 Virginia not only allows direct-to-consumer genetic tests, but has
also taken steps to ensure that physicians and healthcare providers are not
harmed by the existence of the industry. Rather than trying to restrict the
industry, Virginia has taken action to accommodate it.
B.

States that are Silent

Twenty-three states are simply silent on the issue, having no statutes or
regulations addressing the permissibility of patient-ordered genetic tests.74
These are also typically direct-access states.75 Silence by state legislatures
allows DTC testing companies to directly market genetic tests to consumers
67. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 1-2, 4-5, 7, 9-13.
68. Id. at 1-9, 11-12, 14.
69. Id. at 1, 3-4, 6, 8-10.
70. Id. at 2, 8, 10, 13.
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.18 (2006).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 1-2, 4-5, 7-13. These states are
Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia. Id.
75. Id.
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without the need for an order by a physician or any other learned
intermediary.76 Also, these states do not impose strict state laboratory
licensing or informed consent requirements.77 Through their silence, these
states imply that DTC genetic tests do not fall within their state definitions of
the unlawful practice of medicine. However, in the absence of legislation,
these states could still choose to begin regulating the DTC industry through
changes in common law, agency policy, or through a different interpretation
of their definition of the practice of medicine.
States such as Montana, Missouri, Vermont, and West Virginia have no
laws relating to authorization to order genetic tests.78 Nebraska law is silent
on authority to order genetic tests, however it attempts to impose a written
informed consent requirement on those who order predictive genetic tests
through a physician.79 Yet, if a patient directly orders the test himself,
informed consent is not required.80
Some states authorize the DTC genetic testing industry implicitly by not
including these tests within their definition of the “practice of medicine.”81
Under Colorado law, the practice of medicine does not include provision of
laboratory tests to patients in a CLIA certified laboratory.82 Therefore
Colorado imposes no licensing requirements and permits DTC genetic
testing.83 In Utah, the practice of medicine is defined as “to diagnose, treat,
correct, administer anesthesia, or prescribe . . . by an individual in Utah or
outside the state upon or for any human within the state.”84 However, DTC
genetic tests are not viewed as being diagnostic, as an internal legal opinion
from the Utah Department of Health holds that ordering a test, performing
the test, and delivering the results does not constitute the “practice of
medicine.”85
Through passive silence, these direct access states provide minimal
regulation of the DTC genetic testing industry. This wide latitude given to the
industry provides for freedom to access genetic information, but does not
offer consumers any protection against potentially misleading results. These
states place the responsibility of being actively informed participants upon

76. “Learned intermediary” is defined as a person in the chain of distribution between the
manufacturer and consumer, who is aware of the risks of the product and has the
responsibility to inform the end-user. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 890, 970 (9th ed. 2009).
77. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 1-2, 4-5, 7-13.
78. Id. at 7, 12, 13.
79. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-551 (2011).
80. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 8.
81. See id. at 1-2, 12.
82. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-106(3)(u) (2011).
83. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 2.
84. UTAH CODE § 58-67-102 (2012).
85. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 12.
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the shoulders of consumers who wish to know more about their genetic
makeup.
C. States Prohibiting DTC Genetic Tests
Fifteen states have statutes and regulations in place that effectively ban
the DTC genetic testing industry.86 These states prohibit DTC genetic testing
in a variety of ways, such as limiting the authorization to order medical tests
and receive results, laboratory licensing, imposing informed consent
requirements, and the scope of definition of the practice of medicine.87
1. Authorization to Order Medical Tests
The simplest way to regulate the DTC testing industry is through statutes
or regulations controlling the authority to request clinical laboratory tests. By
altering the definition of an authorized person, states can effectively prevent
companies from providing services to consumers without the participation of
a physician or other qualified personnel.
California law spells out specific tests that may be requested by any
person without the need of a physician.88 These include “pregnancy,
glucose level, cholesterol, occult blood, and any other for which there is a
test for a particular analyte approved by the FDA for sale to the public
without a prescription, in the form of an over-the-counter test kit.”89 This list
does not include genetics tests, meaning any orders from a DTC genetic
testing company in California must go through a physician.90
New York also prohibits marketing genetic tests directly to consumers.91
New York regulations state “a clinical laboratory shall examine specimens
only at the request of licensed physicians or other persons authorized by law
to use the findings of laboratory examinations in their practice or the
performance of their official duties.”92 Other authorized persons who can
request examination of specimens include dentists, podiatrists, chiropractors,
physician’s assistants, licensed midwives, nurse practitioners, police officers,
and judges.93 Additionally, New York prohibits laboratories from reporting
the results directly to the patient:
86. Id. at 1-9, 11-12, 14. These states are Alabama, California, Connecticut, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Wyoming. Id.
87. See Ray, Will Other States Follow NY, Calif., in Taking on DTC Genetic-Testing
Firms?, supra note 62.
88. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 1246.5 (West 2012).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 9-10.
92. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 58-1.7(b) (2012).
93. Id. § 58-1.7(b)(2).
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No person shall report the result of any test, examination or analysis of a
specimen submitted for evidence of human disease or medical condition
except to a physician, his agent, or other person authorized by law to
employ the results thereof in the conduct of his practice or in the fulfillment
of his official duties. Reports shall not be issued to the patients concerned
except with the written consent of the physician or other authorized person.94

Maryland has also limited the use of DTC genetic tests, despite claiming
to be “the state for progressive bioscience development.”95 State regulations
provide that a laboratory may not perform a test without authorization from
a court of law, doctor, or other authorized person such as a midwife, nurse
practitioner, physician’s assistant, chiropractor, or employer requesting a
job-related drug or alcohol test.96 Further, a laboratory may not release the
test results to patients, nor to anyone other than the authorized person.97
There is an exception for certain health awareness tests, approved by the
Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene and performed at a temporary
laboratory, which may be provided directly to consumers.98 However,
genetic tests do not qualify under this exception.99
Massachusetts law restricts the ordering of medical tests and receipt of
results to doctors and other authorized people; however, there is a large
exception for those tests that promote “health awareness and education
among the general public by early detection of disease and/or associated
risk factors.”100 These tests that fall under the exemption are not going to be
used “for the purpose of providing clinical diagnosis or treatment to
patients.”101 As a result direct-to-consumer marketing is permitted for eight
types of tests including pregnancy and cholesterol, but not genetics.102
2. Laboratory Licensing
Through their police power, states have the authority to license the
healthcare industry.103 Licenses are used to enforce disciplinary actions,
94. Id. § 58-1.8.
95. Bio in Maryland, MD. BIOTECHNOLOGY CTR., http://marylandbiocenter.org/Bio
science%20of%20Maryland/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited Sep. 29, 2012).
96. MD. CODE REGS. 10.10.06.02 (2011).
97. Id. 10.10.06.04.
98. Id. 10.10.01.03; GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 6.
99. MD. CODE REGS. 10.10.03.02B; GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 6.
100. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 6-7.
101. 105 MASS. CODE REGS. 180.010 (2012).
102. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 7; Health Promotion Screening
Program Approval, MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH CLINICAL LAB. PROGRAM, http://webcache.
googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:_ur3q7Hs8cUJ:www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/dph/
clInicallab/health-promo-screening-general-info.rtf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (last
visited Sep. 29, 2012).
103. FURROW ET AL., supra note 36, at 117.
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regulate the scope of services, and prevent unqualified people from
attempting to provide services to the public.104
California law requires all laboratories performing these genetic tests to
undergo evaluation of accuracy and medical utility,105 and also imposes
licensing requirements upon the scientists performing the tests.106 California
regulations state that “[a] clinical laboratory performing clinical laboratory
tests or examinations classified as of moderate or of high complexity under
CLIA107 shall obtain a clinical laboratory license.”108 Also, “it is unlawful for
any person to own, operate, maintain, direct or engage in the business of
operating a clinical laboratory . . . unless he or she possesses a valid
clinical laboratory license issued by the department,”109 and
no person may solicit or accept any biological specimen for clinical
laboratory testing or examination unless there is in effect for the clinical
laboratory where the test or examination is to be performed a license . . .,
and the person performing the test or examination is authorized to perform
the test or examination.110

There is also a provision that allows the Department of Public Health to
retain the ability to
not issue a license or registration until it is satisfied that the clinical
laboratory will be operated within the spirit and intent of this chapter, that
the owners and laboratory directors are each of good moral character, and
that the granting of the license will not be in conflict with the interests of
public health.111

This adds a subjective element to the California licensing scheme, which
encourages DTC genetic testing companies to make good faith efforts to
comply with state laws, or risk not being granted a license in the future.

104. Id.
105. Robert Langreth, California orders stop to gene testing, FORBES (June 14, 2008),
http://www.forbes.com/2008/06/14/stop-gene-testing-biz-healthcare-cz_rl_0614gene
test.html.
106. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 1288.5 (West 2012).
107. CLIA assigns a level of complexity of 1, 2 or 3 to seven criteria of each laboratory test
system. CLIA Categorization Criteria, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., (Mar. 20, 2009),
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/IVDRegulatoryAssistance/
ucm124208.htm. A score of 1 indicates low complexity, while a score of 3 indicates high
complexity. Id. A test with a total score of 12 or more is categorized as high complexity. Id.
The seven categories are knowledge, training and experience, reagents and materials
preparations, characteristics of operational steps, calibration, quality control and interpretation
and judgment. Id.
108. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 1265(a)(1) (West 2012).
109. Id. §1281.
110. Id. § 1288.5.
111. Id. § 1265(c).
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New York’s Clinical Laboratory Evaluation Program (CLEP) is at least as
stringent as CLIA, imposing stricter requirements on laboratories operating
within the state, and giving New York CLIA-exempt status.112 New York
requires evidence of both the analytical and clinical validity of all tests,
approval of all tests before they can be marketed (including ones not subject
to FDA approval), and biennial laboratory inspections.113 New York
regulations also require a clinical laboratory to have a permit before it can
solicit and accept specimens for the purpose of diagnosis, prevention, or
treatment of a disease, or the assessment of a health condition.114 As a
result of the requirement that all laboratories soliciting samples from New
York residents are required to obtain this license, nearly 75% of all cytogenic
and genetic tests in the United States are subject to CLEP.115
Maryland regulations also establish quality assurance standards for
licensed laboratories, including criteria such as effective supervision, quality
control, and safety procedures.116 Additionally, Maryland prohibits
physicians from sending specimens to laboratories that are not licensed
within the state.117 Specifically, genetic testing laboratories must provide
written verification from the laboratory director that direct-to-consumer
specimens will not be accepted from Maryland, nor will testing be
performed on such specimens.118
3. Informed Consent Requirements
In addition to physician ordering and laboratory licensing, states can
also regulate the genetic testing industry by implementing conditions of
informed consent. These regulations can easily be tailored to meet the
concerns of individual states, and are directly aimed at ensuring each
individual consumer has a meaningful understanding of the risks and
benefits of the test.
New York law specifies informed consent requirements for genetic
tests.119 The laboratory must provide a statement of the purpose of the test,

112. Borque et al., supra note 48, at 10.
113. Id. Analytical validity involves correctly detecting the appropriate genetic variation,
and clinical validity involves the relationship between the variation and the associated health
condition. Frueh et al., supra note 24, at 513.
114. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 58-1.7 (2012).
115. Borque et al., supra note 48, at 10.
116. MD. CODE REGS. 10.10.06.02 (2011).
117. Ray, Will Other States Follow NY, Calif., in Taking on DTC Genetic-Testing Firms?,
supra note 62.
118. MD. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, REQUIRED DOCUMENTATION 1 (Jan. 5,
2012), available at http://dhmh.maryland.gov/ohcq/Labs/docs/LabsApps/Required%20Docu
mentation%20Grid.pdf.
119. Borque et al., supra note 48, at 12.
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a description of the disease or condition being tested for, the level of
certainty that a positive result serves as a predictor for the disease, and the
name of persons to whom the results can be disclosed.120 However, most
often laboratories simply enclose a consent form with the kit.121 This usually
fails to satisfy the legally-sufficient requirement of a meaningful discussion
between provider and patient, and exposes the offending company to risk of
a civil fine.122
Michigan also imposes informed consent requirements for genetic
tests.123 The law requires that “a physician or an individual to whom the
physician has delegated authority . . . shall not order a presymptomatic or
predictive genetic test without first obtaining the written, informed consent of
the test subject.”124 This is another way to ensure that ordering of a genetic
test occurs through a physician and that the subject is aware of the potential
benefits and harms of undergoing the test.
4. The Practice of Medicine
Even without laws specifically authorizing persons to order clinical tests,
states can regulate the DTC industry through their interpretation of the
definition of the practice of medicine. Traditionally, states have regulated the
practice of medicine through their police power, and no one seriously
questions their ability to promote regulations for the protection of the public
health.125 State medical practice acts prohibit anyone but licensed
professionals from engaging in the practice of medicine.126 The state
medical board has primary responsibility for preventing the unauthorized
practice of medicine by imposing criminal sanctions and revoking the
licenses of any physicians who aid the unlicensed practitioner.127 Definitions
of the practice of medicine vary from state to state, but most include
diagnosis, prescribing, and surgical interventions.128 These variations reflect
historical and political factors, as well as differences in attitudes and
ideologies.129

120. Id. at 12.
121. Id. at 14.
122. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-l(5)(a) (McKinney 2012); Borque et al., supra note 48, at
14-15.
123. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 7.
124. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.17020 (2012).
125. Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the Practice of
Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV.149, 159 (2004).
126. FURROW ET AL., supra note 36, at 140.
127. Id.
128. Noah, supra note 125, at 162.
129. Id. at 165.
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Some DTC genetic test companies claim that they only provide
information on health-related predispositions, and are not involved in
diagnosis, giving medical advice, or the practice of medicine. For example,
Mari Baker, the chief executive of Navigenics stated that the test “‘doesn’t
say you have a disease,’ . . . ‘it says you carry a genetic predisposition for
the disease and should talk with a health care professional.’“130 However,
some disagree. They see the provision of information regarding probabilities
of severe disease or other health conditions as the practice of medicine.
Moreover, they point out that some DTC genetic test company
advertisements claim to empower customers to make informed decisions
about their health, seemingly emphasizing the medical purpose of the
tests.131 The AMA is of the position that results that are presented as an
increase or decrease in risk of a condition are diagnostic, and should be
prohibited as the unauthorized practice of medicine.132
Deciding whether or not DTC genetic tests are the practice of medicine
has proved to be difficult. For example, most agree that tests for ancestry do
not constitute the practice of medicine, while single-gene determinative tests
such as those for Huntington’s disease do.133 However, many traits that are
screened for in these tests involve multiple genes and environmental factors,
and result in only increased or decreased probabilities of susceptibility.134
The difficulty lies in determining where along this spectrum DTC genetic
testing companies cross over into the unauthorized practice of medicine. In
June 2008, California, along with New York and Maryland, determined that
use of genetic tests in performing risk assessments fell within the scope of
state regulation.135
In New York, the practice of medicine is defined as “diagnosing,
treating, operating or prescribing for any human disease, pain, injury,
deformity or physical condition.”136 In regards to DTC genetic tests, a
director from the New York State Department of Health stated, “We think if
you’re telling people you have increased risk of adverse health effects, that’s

130. Andrew Pollack, Gene Testing Questioned by Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2008,
at C2.
131. Kishore, supra note 45, at 1566. For example, 23andMe’s website encourages
visitors to, “Take a more active role in managing your health.” Taking a more active role in
managing your health, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/health/ (last visited Sept. 26,
2012).
132. Maves, supra note 25, at 3.
133. Kishore, supra note 45, at 1565-66.
134. Id. at 1566.
135. CLINICAL LAB. TECH. ADVISORY COMM., CA. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, MINUTES OF THE JUNE
25, 2010 MEETING 5 (2010), available at http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/lfs/Documents/
CLTAC-minutes-25Jun10.pdf.
136. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6521 (McKinney 2012).
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medical advice.“137 In California, the unlawful practice of medicine involves
any unlicensed person who practices “any system or mode of treating the
sick or afflicted in this state, or who diagnoses, treats, operates for or
prescribes for any ailment, blemish, deformity, disease, disfigurement,
disorder, injury, or other physical or mental condition of any person.”138 It
appears that like New York, California believes that DTC genetic tests
diagnose disorders or physical conditions. In Maryland the “practice of
medicine” means “to engage, with or without compensation, in medical
diagnosis, healing, treatment, or surgery” and includes “diagnosing,
healing, treating, preventing, prescribing for, or removing any physical,
mental, emotional ailment or supposed ailment of an individual by . . .
appliance, test, drug, operation or treatment.”139 This definition specifically
includes the uses of tests within the practice of medicine, seemingly
encompassing DTC genetic tests. Massachusetts’ most recent proposed
regulations provide that the practice of medicine involves:
conduct, the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of which is to
encourage the reliance of another person upon an individual’s knowledge
or skill in the maintenance of human health by the prevention, alleviation or
cure of disease . . . or reasonably thought to involve an assumption of
responsibility for the other person’s physical or mental well being: diagnosis,
treatment, use of instruments or other devices . . . .140

This definition is different from the others in that it focuses on the
relationship between patient and practitioner. This kind of reliance is readily
apparent in the DTC genetic testing model. Michigan directly bans DTC
genetic tests through its definition of the practice of medicine,141 which
means the “diagnosis, treatment, prevention, cure or relieving of a human
disease, . . . by . . . device, diagnostic test, or other means, or offering,
undertaking attempting to do, or holding oneself out as able to do, any of
these acts.”142 According to an official with the Michigan Department of
Community Health, ordering and receiving tests is considered the practice of
medicine, and therefore DTC genetic testing is banned.143
Even though some of these definitions do not appear to be obviously
different from those in direct access states, they serve as one of the available
tools states can use to impose regulations on the DTC genetic testing
industry. In general, it appears the distinction can be found in whether or

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Pollack, Gene Testing Questioned by Regulators, supra note 130.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2052 (West 2012).
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 14-101(n) (West 2012).
243 MASS. CODE REGS. 2.01 (2012).
GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 7.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.17001(1)(f) (2012).
GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 7.
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not states view DTC genetic tests as involved in diagnosis, and therefore are
included within the definition of the unlawful practice of medicine.
IV. STATE ACTIONS
Despite all of the laws and regulations outlined above, many DTC
genetic testing companies initially offered their services in every state,
without physician prescriptions, state laboratory licenses, or proper informed
consent.144 It took the rapid growth of the industry and a number of
consumer complaints to draw attention to the violations.145 In the absence
of federal regulations, the states took action. In 2008, some of the states
that had decided to ban DTC genetic testing began to investigate the
compliance of online companies with their laws and regulations.146 When
they found companies in violation of their statutes and regulations, these
states took steps to bring the industry into compliance, including sending
cease and desist letters, threatening civil fines, and raising public awareness
of the violations.147 They also began the process of issuing state laboratory
licenses to those able to meet applicable standards.148 States such as New
York and California have been fairly successful in bringing most personal
genomics services into line.149 In the three years following this flurry of
enforcement by the states, there have been few major actions undertaken in
furtherance of the regulation of the DTC genetic testing industry.150
A.

Cease and Desist Letters

In June 2008, the California Department of Public Health sent cease
and desist letters to 16 genetic testing companies, including industry leaders
23andMe, deCODEme and Navigenics, notifying them of violations of state
laws and ordering them to stop testing until they provided proof of
compliance.151 These letters were sent as a result of an investigation
prompted by a number of consumer complaints about the accuracy and

144. See, e.g., Ray, Will Other States Follow NY, Calif., in Taking on DTC Genetic-Testing
Firms?, supra note 62 (Navigenics, 23andMe, and deCODEme operated in all 50 states as of
publication of this news article on July 02, 2008).
145. Wadman, supra note 47, at 1148.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Pollack, Gene Testing Questioned by Regulators, supra note 130.
149. See infra Part V.
150. LEACHMAN ET AL., AM. SOC’Y OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY, DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC
TESTING: PERSONALIZED MEDICINE IN EVOLUTION 38 (2011), available at http://www.asco.org/
ASCOv2/Home/Education%20&%20Training/Educational%20Book/PDF%20Files/2011/zds
00111000034.PDF.
151. Bourque et al., supra note 48, at 11.
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affordability of the tests.152 California’s chief of Laboratory Field Services,
Karen Nickel, stated, “‘We [are] no longer tolerating direct-to-consumer
genetic testing in California.’”153 She said, “These businesses are apparently
operating without a clinical laboratory license in California. The genetic tests
have not been validated for clinical utility and accuracy, and they are
scaring a lot of people to death.’“154 The letters pointed out defects of both
failing to have a license to conduct laboratory testing in the state and
offering genetic tests to California residents without a physician’s order.155
The targeted companies were given two weeks to submit a plan of how they
intended to “‘prevent further violation of California state laboratory law.’“156
At the June 23, 2008 deadline, only one company had announced it
would stop marketing its services in California and direct its customers to
order the genetic tests through a physician.157 23andMe and Navigenics
both stated that they believed they were already complying with all
California laws and would not change their operations.158 At the time, both
companies sub-contracted with California-certified laboratories to perform
the genome scans,159 however, the companies performed their own analysis
of the genetic data without state licenses.160 Also, both companies employed
California-licensed physicians to order the genetic tests on behalf of
customers, apparently satisfying California’s physician prescription
requirements.161 However, as pointed out by Dr. Kathy Hudson of Johns
Hopkins University, the personal physician relationship called for by state
regulations is vastly different from a prescription ordered by “some doc on
the payroll at Genes R Us.”162 Although California has questioned the extent
of physician involvement in ordering, it appears that at least for the moment,
a staff physician is sufficient.163

152. Langreth, supra note 105.
153. Wadman, supra note 47, at 1148.
154. Langreth, supra note 105.
155. Wadman, supra note 47, at 1148.
156. Ray, Will Other States Follow NY, Calif., in Taking on DTC Genetic-Testing Firms?,
supra note 62.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Andrew Pollack, California Licenses 2 Companies to Offer Gene Services, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 2008, at C3.
161. Ray, Will Other States Follow NY, Calif., in Taking on DTC Genetic-Testing Firms?,
supra note 62.
162. Pollack, Gene Testing Questioned by Regulators, supra note 138.
163. Turna Ray, In Calif., Outsourcing Genotyping Services to Licensed Lab May Not Equal
Compliance, GENOMEWEB, PHARMACOGENETICS REPORTER (June 25, 2008), http://www.gen
omeweb.com/dxpgx/calif-outsourcing-genotyping-services-licensed-lab-may-not-equalcompliance.
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deCODEme’s response was to suggest that California sent them a cease
and desist letter in error because they did not market directly to Californian
consumers.164 deCODEme’s Chief Scientific Officer stated that the company
would not offer its tests to California residents until it received a state
license, and even then, the tests would only be offered through
physicians.165 However, deCODEme continued to offer its ancestry services
in every state including California, since they believed this type of test was
not included in the definition of diagnostic testing.166
The New York State Department of Health sent similar cease and desist
letters to 26 companies between November 2007 and June 2008.167
Navigenics placed its New York customers on a waiting list until its subcontracted laboratory Affymetrix received a New York license.168 Both
Navigenics’ and 23andMe’s sub-contracted laboratories also received
warning letters from New York.169 These letters were effective, as evidenced
by the very few personal genomics companies currently operating within the
state.170
B.

Licensing

Licensing of laboratories is another tool states can use to encourage
compliance. It can be used as a stick to impose sanctions on companies
who refuse to cooperate, but can also be a carrot used to entice companies
to comply. Earning a state license can serve as proof of the legitimacy and
quality of a company’s business and scientific claims, and offer a
competitive advantage over others in the industry.
In order to earn a California license, a laboratory must address the
intended use and purpose of the test, the patient population, and provide
methodology and samples that can be used to validate their procedures.171
In particular, the accuracy and precision of the algorithm needs to be
validated by the Department of Public Health.172 In August 2008, California
granted Navigenics and 23andMe laboratory licenses after a review found

164. Ray, Will Other States Follow NY, Calif., in Taking on DTC Genetic-Testing Firms?,
supra note 62.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Wadman, supra note 47, at 1149.
168. Ray, Will Other States Follow NY, Calif., in Taking on DTC Genetic-Testing Firms?,
supra note 62.
169. Id.
170. See infra Part V.
171. CLINICAL LAB. TECH. ADVISORY COMM., CA. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, MINUTES OF THE
SEPTEMBER 5, 2008 MEETING 5 (2008), available at http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/lfs/Do
cuments/CLTAC%20minutes%2005Sep08.pdf.
172. Id.
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their genetic analysis procedures were based on valid, current scientific
literature.173 As of June 2010, 15 laboratories using DTC genetic algorithms
were licensed to operate in California.174
An application for a New York Laboratory Permit involves disclosure of
materials and methods, interpretation of results, and validation studies.175
The application form also states that consent forms must comply with the
Genetic Testing Confidentiality Law Art. 7, § 79-l.176 Each consent form
must be disease-specific, and laboratories should have a policy in place to
ensure the patient agrees to each test requested.177 In 2010, Navigenics
became the first personal genomics service to receive a state laboratory
license from New York, and because their business model already required
physician ordering, they are one of the few companies legally able to offer
their genetic testing services in that state.178
C. Civil Fines
Accompanying California’s cease and desist letters were threats of civil
and criminal sanctions.179 Under California law, each company in question
was facing fines of up to $3,000 per day or per violation if there was no
immediate jeopardy to California residents, and fines from $3,050 to
$10,000 per day or per violation if immediate jeopardy was present.180
Additionally, California had the possibility of imposing onsite monitoring as
defined under CLIA,181 as well as imposing the cost of the onsite monitoring
on the offending company.182 In New York, a violation of owning or
operating a clinical laboratory without a valid permit can result in a civil

173. Pollack, California Licenses 2 Companies to Offer Gene Services, supra note 160.
174. CLINICAL LAB. TECH. ADVISORY COMM., CA. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, MINUTES OF THE JUNE
25, 2010 MEETING 5, supra note 135.
175. STATE OF N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, ASSAY APPROVAL IN GENETIC TESTING – MOLECULAR 2-4
(2011), available at http://www.wadsworth.org/labcert/TestApproval/forms/Genetic_Test ing_
Molecular_Checklist.pdf.
176. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 97-L (McKinney 2012); STATE OF N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra
note 175, at 4.
177. STATE OF N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 175, at 4.
178. The Navigator, Working Closely With Regulators – A Navigenics Core Principle,
NAVIGENICS (May 13, 2010), http://blog.navigenics.com/articles/comments/working_close
ly_with_regulators_a_navigenics_core_principle/ (on file with author).
179. Wadman, supra note 47, at 1148.
180. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 1310(b) (West 2012).
181. 42 C.F.R. § 493.1836 (2011). “CMS may require continuous or intermittent
monitoring of a plan of correction by the State survey agency to ensure the laboratory makes
the improvements necessary to bring it into compliance with the condition level requirements.”
Id.
182. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 1310(e) (West 2012).
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penalty of up to $2,000 per day.183 Apparently the threat of substantial
monetary sanctions was significant enough to quickly bring most of the
targeted companies into compliance with state laws.
The use of company-employed physicians to rubber stamp consumer
orders is another area where civil fines could play a role in enforcement. If
states are unhappy with the practice of using company physicians to satisfy
the physician prescription requirement, they may take actions similar to
those in enforcement regarding telemedicine. Like DTC genetic tests, the
telemedicine industry does not easily recognize state boundaries.184 As a
result, many states adopted specific statutes relating to the practice of
telemedicine.185 For example, a California statue imposes a fine of up to
$25,000 against the physicians themselves for each episode of prescribing
dangerous drugs without an appropriate prior examination and medical
indication.186 States who would like to prohibit a DTC genetic company
from employing its own physicians in order to more fully satisfy the
physician-prescription requirements may choose to enact similar statues to
penalize those physicians who order genetic tests without a good faith
examination or a true face to face doctor-patient relationship.
D. Public Awareness
Public awareness about the DTC genetic testing industry has grown
immensely in recent years, and is another available tool states can use to
pressure companies into compliance. For example, the distribution of the
cease and desist letters by both California and New York were widely
publicized in the media.187 In March 2011, Maryland’s Attorney General
posted an online letter entitled “At-Home Genetic Tests: Proceed with
Caution.”188 It warned Maryland residents to consult their physician before
and after a test, and that “no at-home genetic test has been reviewed or has
had their claims evaluated for accuracy by the FDA.”189 If the residents of a
state are aware a DTC genetic testing company is continuing to flirt with
violations of state law, customers will become wary and business in that
state will surely decline.

183. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 577(5) (McKinney 2012).
184. FURROW ET AL., supra note 36, at 130.
185. Id.
186. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2242.1 (West 2012).
187. See, e.g., Pollack, Gene Testing Questioned by Regulators, supra note 130; Brody,
supra note 21; Langreth, supra note 105.
188. At-Home Genetic Tests: Proceed with Caution, MD. ATT’Y GEN. (March 2011),
http://www.oag.state.md.us/consumer/genetictesting.htm.
189. Id.
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V. INDUSTRY REACTION AND CURRENT PRACTICE
DTC genetic testing companies have had varying reactions to the
implementation and enforcement of state regulations. Some have altered
their national business models to ensure compliance in the most stringent
states, some have varied their practices between states, and others have
forged ahead, only nominally claiming to adhere to the applicable
standards.
A.

Navigenics190

On July 27, 2010, California-based Navigenics issued a press release
in response to federal regulatory meetings indicating a willingness to work
with authorities.191 Navigenics’ CEO testified at the House of
Representatives’ hearing on “Direct-To-Consumer Genetic Testing and the
Consequences to the Public Health.”192 The statement recognized the
variation in practice between genetic testing companies, claiming that
Navigenics has taken a very conservative approach and has been in
constant contact with the FDA.193 In addition, Navigenics received a state
license from the State of California’s Department of Public Health in
2008,194 a clinical laboratory permit from the New York State Department
of Health in January 2010,195 and is the only personal genomics company
with approval to operate in all 50 states.196

190. Subsequent to the submission of this article, Navigenics underwent a significant
change. Their homepage currently reads: “Navigenics was recently acquired by Life
Technologies, a global biotechnology company dedicated to innovation and improving life in
meaningful ways. . . . We are no longer accepting orders or samples for the Navigenics
Health Compass service.” Our acquisition by Life Technologies, NAVIGENICS (2012),
http://www.navigenics.com/. The Frequently Asked Questions Page states “[a]s of August 3,
2012, we will not be accepting new orders going forward.” Your questions answered,
NAVIGENICS (2012), http://www.navigenics.com/visitor/about_us/acquisition_faqs//. As a
result, many of the following citations no longer exist on the Navigenics website; however they
remain on file with the author as noted.
191. Press Release, Navigenics Statement, NAVIGENICS (July 27, 2010), available at
http://www.navigenics.com/visitor/about_us/press/releases/statement_072710/ (on file with
author).
192. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing and the Consequences to the Public: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter Vanier Testimony] (testimony of Vance Vanier, Chief
Executive Officer, Navigenics, Inc.).
193. Id. at 3-4.
194. NAVIGENICS, The Navigator, Working Closely with Regulators – A Navigenics Core
Principle, supra note 178.
195. Id.
196. NAVIGENICS, Press Release, Navigenics Statement, supra note 191.
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Upon the launch of the Navigenics Health Compass services in 2008,
the company released a ten point list of model standards for the personal
genomics industry.197 These standards include validity, accuracy, clinical
relevance,198 actionability, access to genetic counseling, security and
privacy, ownership of information, physician education and engagement,
transparency, and measurement.199
Navigenics’ business model does not vary between states and is
designed to comply with the most stringent requirements currently in
place.200 Navigenics only offers its genetic analysis services through
physicians and corporate wellness programs.201 For those patients whose
physicians do not offer the service, Navigenics provides a list of available
physicians in a number of states who have integrated the service into their
practice.202 Physicians are not listed in every state, and Navigenics disclaims
any apparent endorsement or recommendations of any physician’s
capabilities.203 Rather than employing a company physician to order tests on
behalf of customers, Navigenics appears to take much more of a hands-off
approach, encouraging potential customers to find their own physician who
is willing to order the test on their behalf. This allows the company to avoid
any potential violations of physician prescription or informed consent
requirements. In addition, a disclaimer is present at the bottom of every
page on Navigenics’ website, “Navigenics does not provide medical advice,
diagnosis or treatment.”204 The “Frequently Asked Questions Page”
specifically directs residents of New York to call for more information about

197. Press Release, Navigenics proposes standards for personal genomics services,
coupled with prospective outcomes studies, to safeguard consumers, NAVIGENICS (April 8,
2008), http://www.navigenics.com/visitor/about_us/press/releases/standards_release_04
0808/ (on file with author).
198. Navigenics defines clinical relevance as only using genetic risk factors that have been
shown to have consistent effect sizes with supporting information vetted by competent
reviewers, and with content screened by leading medical institutions or reputable independent
providers. Id.; Our selection criteria, NAVIGENICS (2012), http://www.navigenics.com/visi
tor/about_us/our_science/selection_criteria/ (on file with author).
199. NAVIGENICS, Press Release, Navigenics proposes standards for personal genomics
services, coupled with prospective outcomes studies, to safeguard consumers, supra note
197.
200. Service FAQs, NAVIGENICS, http://www.navigenics.com/visitor/what_we_offer/
faqs/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2012) (on file with author).
201. Id.
202. Find a physician, NAVIGENICS, http://ww.navigenics.com/visitor/about_us/find_a_
physician/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (on file with author).
203. Id.
204. Navigenics, Gene-ius, A smart way to look at your health, NAVIGENICS,
http://www.navigenics.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
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ordering,205 and provides a link to special ordering instructions and forms
for Maryland residents.206
B.

deCODEme

Iceland-based deCODE received its California Clinical Laboratory
License in 2009, allowing California residents to purchase its deCODEme
products.207 Also in 2009, the CLIA-registered laboratory was accredited by
the College of American Pathologists.208 This accreditation carries deeming
authority from the CMS, and may help deCODE to meet some state
certification requirements.209
Rather than entirely eliminating their DTC service, deCODEme has
chosen to alter business practices between states when necessary, to comply
with stricter state laws. The deCODEme Service Agreement acknowledges
that some states do not permit residents to obtain information from genetic
scans without the involvement of a qualified healthcare professional.210
Therefore, unless the scan is ordered under the supervision of a physician
who provides qualified counseling, certain genetic risk information may be
omitted for residents of Arizona, California, Connecticut, Georgia,
Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
and Wyoming.211 It also admits that deCODEme does not have the required
state laboratory licenses in Maryland and New York, and therefore, their
services are not available to residents of those states.212
C. 23andMe
23andMe participated in the two-day FDA advisory panel meeting in
March 2011, expressing concern that in the future tests may only be
available through a physician, and reiterating its founding belief that

205. NAVIGENICS, Service FAQs, supra note 200.
206. Maryland ordering instructions, NAVIGENICS, http://www.navigenics.com/visitor/
what_we_offer/faqs/maryland_orders/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (on file with author).
These instructions involve completing the order through a physician or corporate wellness
program, completion of a Test Request Form by the patient and physician, and faxing the
completed form to Navigenics Member Services. Id.
207. deCODE Receives California Clinical Laboratory License, DECODE GENETICS (Feb.
19, 2009), http://www.decode.com/news/news.php?story=52.
208. deCODE Genotyping Laboratory Receives College of American Pathologists
Accreditation, DECODE GENETICS (May 20, 2009), http://www.decode.com/news/news.
php?story=49.
209. Id.
210. deCODEme Genetic Scan Service Agreement and Informed Consent, DECODEME
(April 16, 2012), http://www.decodeme.com/service-agreement.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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individuals have the right to access their own genetic information.213
23andMe received a license from the California Department of Public
Health in 2008, allowing them to serve customers in that state.214 23andMe
does not employ its own genetic counselors, but rather has partnered with
Informed Medical Decisions, Inc. to offer independent genetic counseling to
its customers.215 This service is optional, and comes with an additional
cost.216
23andMe does not appear to acknowledge state limitations as openly
on its website as some other personal genetics companies. Buried in the
Terms of Service is a statement admitting that there are some jurisdictions
where service is not available because the company lacks the required
licenses.217 A customer does not learn of many of these restrictions until he
or she attempts to buy a test kit. Upon trying to ship to New York, a notice
appears to warn the customer that 23andMe is not able to process samples
mailed from New York, because of a lack of laboratory license and
physician involvement.218 However, the customer has the option of having
the kit shipped to New York, and is required to affirm the sample will not be
collected in, nor mailed from New York.219 Although it is illegal to spit in a
test-tube for a DTC genetic test in New York, there is nothing to prevent a
consumer from going to another state to spit and have the test
performed.220 Upon trying to ship to Maryland, the pop-up states that
23andMe is currently unable to offer services in that state, without further
explanation.221 Upon selecting other restricted states such as California, no
such notice arises.222 Unlike Navigenics, 23andMe seems intent on
continuing the direct-to-consumer service as long as possible, until it is
directly faced with a serious threat of state action.

213. The Spittoon, DTC Genetic tests and the future of regulation: Make your voices
heard, 23ANDME (April 4, 2011), http://spittoon.23andme.com/2011/04/04/dtc-gene
tic-tests-and-the-future-of-regulation-make-your-voices-heard/#more-8727.
214. Pollack, California Licenses 2 Companies to Offer Gene Services, supra note 160.
215. 23andMe Enlists Informed Medical Decisions to Make Independent Genetic
Counseling Services Available to Customers, 23ANDME (June 3, 2010), https://www.23
andme.com/about/press/20100603/.
216. Id.
217. Terms of service, 23ANDME (2012), https://www.23andme.com/about/tos/.
218. Store, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/store/shipping/ (last visited Sept.
21, 2012).
219. Id.
220. Brody, supra note 21.
221. 23ANDME, Store, supra note 218.
222. Id.
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VI. ANALYSIS
Ultimately, some standards need to be implemented. Regulation cannot
be left to the industry itself or to market forces, without first causing some
amount of irreparable harm. Additionally, companies that are able to meet
federal standards will gain an air of legitimacy, while those companies who
are unwilling or unable to meet standards will be filtered out. It may be
argued that in implementing regulation, the government is being overly
paternalistic and denying individuals the right to know information about
their own genetic code.223 However, proponents would counter that
discovery of genetic information is not being withheld, but rather being
forced to be filtered through a different pathway. Others may claim that this
is just another way in which politicians are bending to the will of influential
physician and health system lobbyists.224 While there may be an element of
truth to this argument, it does not change the fact that these DTC genetics
tests are a very powerful tool, and without some form of regulation, there is
a high likelihood of misuse and abuse.
A.

What Type of Regulations?

Regulation should occur at the federal level to reduce the cost and
confusion of complying with multiple state laws. As Mari Baker, chief
executive of Navigenics stated, “in the end this needs to be regulated at the
federal level rather than as a patchwork of state regulations.”225 Although a
small number of states have been successful in enforcing compliance, the
majority of the states are permitting DTC genetic testing to proceed
unregulated.226 Some may argue that regulation at the federal level is an
unwanted intrusion into an area traditionally regulated by states, namely the
definition of the scope of the practice of medicine.227 However, this would
be just one more example in a list of attempts by the federal government to
regulate the practice of medicine, including examples such as the control of
medical marijuana in California, physician-assisted suicide in Oregon, and

223. See Support You Right to Access Your Clinical Lab Results, 23ANDME (Nov. 4,
2011), http://spittoon.23andme.com/news/support-your-right-to-access-your-clinical-labresults/.
224. See, e.g., Daniel MacArthur, American Medical Association: You Can’t Look At
Your Genome Without Our Supervision, WIRED, Feb. 24, 2011, http://www.wired.com/
wiredscience/2011/02/american-medical-association-you-cant-look-at-your-genome-with
out-our-supervision/ (arguing the “‘doctor as universal gatekeeper of health information’
model has to die, no matter how desperately the AMA and its proxies try to keep this
obsolete, paternalistic vision alive.”).
225. Pollack, California Licenses 2 Companies to Offer Gene Services, supra note 160.
226. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 1-2, 4-5, 7, 10, 12-13.
227. Noah, supra note 125, at 149.
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FDA efforts to restrict distribution of approved pharmaceuticals.228 The
practicality of a single system and the industry’s calls for a uniform system
would likely prevail over any federalism concerns. If state actions are failing
to protect consumers, the federal government should not hesitate to
interfere.229
B.

Which Tests Should Be Regulated?

The most practical approach appears to be the one taken by states that
impose regulations only on certain types of DTC genetic tests. Regulators
need to make a distinction between those tests that are purely recreational,
such as those that test for ancestry, eye color, or types of earwax, and those
that have an impact on medical treatments and decisions. Tests that involve
risk factors for disease development, reactions to pharmaceuticals, and risks
of disease inheritance should not be permitted to be marketed directly to
consumers. These types of tests clearly implicate medical considerations and
may even be approaching the status of diagnostic and medical devices. The
risk stratification approach has proved successful before when dealing with
other direct-to-consumer medical devices such as pregnancy tests, and also
when dealing with over-the-counter drugs.230
The Personalized Medicine Coalition distinguishes between medical
genetic tests that are usually ordered by a healthcare provider and
informational genetic tests that can be ordered by individual consumers.231
This distinction is important; however, the coalition’s inclusion of tests meant
to “gain a better understanding of general health and disease
susceptibility,” and of tests for risks of diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease,
diabetes, heart attacks and several types of cancer, in the definition of
informational genetic tests is overly broad.232 These are the kinds of tests
that clearly implicate medical decisions. They have an impact on lifestyle
and future treatment and therefore, should be included in the category of
tests that are only ordered through physicians or other healthcare providers.
Genetic tests should be categorized into medical tests and recreational tests.
Some may argue that drawing a line between medical and recreational
genetic tests will be difficult if not arbitrary.233 However, these are the types

228. See id. at 153, 181-84.
229. Id. at 154.
230. Frueh et al., supra note 24, at 512.
231. PERSONALIZED MED. COAL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATIONAL GENETIC TESTING 23, available at http://www.personalizedmedicinecoalition.org/sites/all/themes/zen_pmc/doc
uments/Medco-PMC-consumer-genetics.pdf.
232. Id. at 3.
233. Jennifer K. Wagner, Understanding FDA Regulation of DTC Genetic Tests within the
Context of Administrative Law, 87 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 451, 453 (2010).
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of decisions regularly faced by the FDA and state licensing boards. While
some tests may fall within a grey area, new laws and regulations can build a
framework to help decision makers come to reasonable conclusions. For
example, a factors test could be used to determine if a particular test
belongs in the medical or recreational category. This test could consider
things such as whether the results of the test are likely to affect a patient’s
behavior or lifestyle, have an impact on the course of current or future
medical treatment, have a strong and lasting emotional effect, or have an
impact on future reproductive decisions.
Those in the industry may argue that this kind of risk stratification of tests
will rob consumers of the convenience of purchasing a single test and using
a single swab to receive all the answers to their genetic questions at one
time. While this is true, sacrificing convenience is a small price to pay for
ensuring consumers are protected. Dividing the industry into medical tests
with more rigid standards and recreational tests with fewer regulatory
hurdles may actually be beneficial for the industry. It would open up two
separate markets, allowing some companies to still market recreational tests
directly to consumers, while allowing those who wish to target the medical
sciences a way to continue to provide valuable services. This system will still
allow consumers the freedom to have their DNA analyzed to satisfy curiosity
about trivial facts, while protecting them from misleading and complicated
medical results that can easily be misinterpreted and lead to harmful
reactions or behaviors.
C. What Should The Regulations Include?
Federal regulators should incorporate lessons from those states that
have successfully managed to impose regulations on the industry. Under the
traditional idea of using the states as laboratories, there have been
experiments with various models.234 Following the examples of states such
as New York, California and Maryland, the federal government should
create regulations that include a combination of physician prescription,
laboratory licensing, and informed consent. Regulation of medical genetic
tests should target both the accuracy and availability of the tests.
First, genetic tests should be performed in CLIA-certified and state
licensed laboratories, and should be subject to testing for both analytical
and clinical validity.235 Regulators could impose their own certification
standards, or require independent accreditation from organizations such as

234. Noah, supra note 125, at 156-57.
235. Frueh et al., supra note 24, at 513.
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the College of American Pathologists.236 These kinds of regulations will
ensure that consumers are receiving high quality tests and the most accurate
information science can currently provide.237
Second, medical genetic tests should only be available through a
physician. Both the AMA and the American Clinical Laboratory Association
support the need for physician guidance in genetic testing.238 The Federal
government needs to implement regulations that ensure physicians are
present to protect consumers from gaps in understanding that can lead to
damaging consequences.239 Simply mandating DTC genetic test companies
to disclose volumes of information would only add to the confusion. Rather,
the regulations should call for a physician, or other qualified intermediary,
who can provide appropriate counseling and answer questions. In order to
ensure adequate counseling, communication, and proper administration of
any informed consent documents, this must be a traditional face-to-face
doctor patient relationship. Physician employees of the DTC genetic testing
companies who rubber stamp requests for medical genetic tests should not
be able to satisfy this requirement. The return of the results through a
physician also ensures patients are not left to their own devices in
interpretation, and are given appropriate medical advice regarding the
consequences. In addition, by filtering the results through a personal
physician, other factors in disease such as family history, lifestyle, and
environment can also be taken into consideration.240
Recommendations from industry should also be incorporated into these
new regulations. For example, principles from Navigenics’ proposed
standards are highly relevant to those seeking to construct an effective
regulatory framework.241 Principles of validity, accuracy, quality, clinical
relevance, and actionability can be used to help stratify genetic tests and
determine which belong in the medical or recreational categories.242
Principles of security, privacy, transparency, and ownership of genetic
information can shape regulation of the business practices of DTC genetic
testing companies.243 Incorporating recommendations from the industry not

236. Press Release, ACLA Supports Physician Guidance in Patient-Centered Genetic
Testing, AM. CLINICAL LAB. ASS’N (May 12, 2010), available at http://www.acla.com/sites/de
fault/files/dtcrelease.pdf.
237. Id.
238. Id.; Maves, supra note 25.
239. AM. CLINICAL LAB. ASS’N, supra note 236.
240. See id.
241. NAVIGENICS, Press Release, Navigenics proposes standards for personal genomics
services, coupled with prospective outcomes studies, to safeguard consumers, supra note
197.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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only encourages cooperation and compliance, but also draws upon the
knowledge of those who know the industry best.
D. How Should The Regulations Be Enforced?
The federal government can also learn important lessons on
enforcement from state experiences. 15 states claim to prohibit DTC genetic
testing on the books, but very few have actually been successful in
enforcement.244 Thanks to industry reactions, we now know what methods
are most effective at bringing DTC genetic testing companies into
compliance with strict regulations.245
When faced with non-compliance, recent history has shown that the
federal government will have to take an active role in enforcement.246
Clearly banning the industry on the books is not enough.247 Tools such as
cease and desist letters, threats of substantial civil fines, and negative
publicity will likely be effective at bringing those errant companies into
compliance. The FDA may also be able to utilize licensing or an analogous
stamp of approval to entice companies into compliance. Such a credential
would give a cooperative company an advantage over competitors, and
would also reassure potential customers about the quality of the tests. By
offering both punishment for disobedience and rewards for compliance, the
federal government should be successful in quickly bringing the DTC
industry in line with the new regulations.
E.

Other Considerations?

In addition to the implementation and enforcement of new regulations,
public education on genetics is essential to arm the population with the
ability to protect themselves from misleading and fraudulent opportunists.
Many of those who were the first to order these tests were enthusiasts who
were well educated in genetics and were able to interpret the results.248
However, as the tests have become more mainstream, the average
consumer is less likely to have this level of understanding, and the results of
the test can cause more harm than good.249 If genetic medicine is truly
going to become part of everyday healthcare, the general public will need
to be further educated. When the public has the ability to receive results of
genetic tests with the appropriate level of skepticism and understanding,
there will be less reliance on government regulations for protection.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 1-9, 11-12, 14.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part IV, V.
See supra Part IV, V.
Frueh et al., supra note 24, at 511.
Id.
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However, until public understanding has had the chance to catch up with
these scientific advances, it is the responsibility of the government to ensure
this new industry develops in a way that is beneficial and not harmful. In
addition to public education, the AMA recommends that provider education
should also become a priority.250 Physicians must be prepared to provide
interpretation and counseling to patients who present them with results of
genetic tests.251 The AMA has stated that it is prepared to work together with
the FDA to ensure physicians are aware of the risks and benefits of DTC
genetic testing.252
Additionally, the FDA should work with the Federal Trade Commission
to monitor advertising practices of the genetic testing industry. Regulations
should ensure that all relevant information is clearly communicated,
including both the capabilities and limitations of the tests.253 Similar to other
consumer protections, these concepts need to be obviously presented, in
simple language to facilitate understanding by the non-scientific public.
New developments in science and regulation will likely increase the
uniformity and quality of genetic tests. On February 29, 2012, the National
Institutes of Health and CMS launched the Genetic Testing Registry (GTR),
which could help to reduce concerns about abuses in the industry.254 This
online registry compiles data on indications for use, validity, and usefulness
of genetic tests, encouraging transparency in the industry.255 Presently,
participation in the GTR is voluntary; however if participation rates remain
low, it may need to become mandatory to remain effective.256 As science
improves, many of the concerns about DTC genetic testing will likely
decrease and perhaps, the DTC model can then be revisited. However, at
the present time, neither science nor the public are ready.
Critics may claim it is impractical and overly restrictive to impose these
regulations on the medical genetic testing industry. Since this science is
rapidly evolving, it may be difficult to constantly screen every algorithm and
methodology used. A practical approach may be to require approval when
new traits are added to the screen, and regular reviews of existing tests to
evaluate them in the light of new scientific discoveries. Critics may also
claim that the physician prescription requirement will needlessly burden an
250. Maves, supra note 25, at 3.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 2.
254. LEACHMAN ET AL., supra note 150; Confused by genetic tests? NIH’s new online tool
may help, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/
feb2012/od-29.htm.
255. Genetic Testing Registry, OFFICE OF SCI. POLICY, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, http://oba.
od.nih.gov/GTR/gtr_intro.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2012).
256. Maves, supra note 25, at 3.
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already strained healthcare system. However, those consumers who currently
order medical genetic tests directly would likely already discuss the results
with a family physician, particularly if the results are troubling. Even so, new
requirements may result in extra visits to the physician for the sole purpose
of having a genetic test performed. However, like other kinds of new
technology, eventually these genetic screens will simply become another tool
available to the general practitioner in the normal care of patients, and may
even be incorporated into typical physical examinations.257 In the meantime,
this form of regulation may slightly increase the load of the system; however
this cost is outweighed by the benefit of reducing the level of stress of
consumers and the hazards of misinterpretation of results.
VII. CONCLUSION
Genetic testing has the potential to unlock enormous amounts of
personalized information that can be used to improve each individual’s
health. The purpose of regulation should not be to stifle scientific advances
and technological innovation, but rather to protect naive consumers with
blind faith in seemingly omniscient entrepreneurs. Regulation needs to occur
at a uniform federal level, but should incorporate lessons learned from state
attempts at enforcement and regulation.
When consumer rights are protected and testing companies are held to
high standards, everyone will benefit from these exciting scientific advances.
The genetic testing industry holds enormous promise. Given a balanced
regulatory framework, it will inevitably play a large role in making future
medical decisions, encouraging people to take a proactive role in their
health, and in improving human wellbeing. As long as the industry is
developed responsibly, genetic testing can soon fulfill its highly touted role
in improving medicine and the quality of human life.
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